



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK**

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INTER-GOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

**STATEMENT BY H.E. AMBASSADOR CHRISTIAN WENAWESER**

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to thank you for convening this meeting. There are few people at the United Nations whom I respect more and whom I enjoy having a conversation with more than my distinguished colleague from India. I listened to his statement with great interest, but – as a representative of a principality, I do take issue with the assertion that the masses are wiser than the prince. And there are also a few other points on which I would disagree with him.

As is well known – and reflected in the papers you have produced, Mr. Chairman – Liechtenstein has proposed an intermediate model for the expansion of the Security Council. We would not say that this proposal commands a majority nor are we asking anyone to agree with this model, but we would like to hear others say that they understand it. The model is very clear. It would provide for a new category of six seats, which would allow states to serve on the Council for 8-10 years. States would be eligible for immediate reelection, and could therefore serve on the Council permanently – if the membership so decides. The incumbents of these seats would not hold the right to veto. The addition of these seats would take the Council to 21 members, which may help those delegations that advocate a limited expansion of the Council. It could also lead to a larger Council, if combined with an expansion in the category of traditional non-permanent seats. We are flexible on this point.

This model would also include the so-called flip-flop clause, meaning that States would have to make up their mind whether to run for this new category of seats, which would then bar them from running for a two-year seat for a specified period of time. This is of particular interest to small states. It would also entail a strong review clause, which would cover all aspects of the reform: consideration of new categories of seats, the veto, working methods etc. – but it would

not entail any automaticity. While the review is mandatory, its outcome would need to be negotiated.

The distinguished Permanent Representative of India has raised an interesting issue, which is not discussed frequently, but indeed of high importance: how would this model be any easier than the G4 model. I would say that it would not be any easier, but it is certainly clear: there would be a General Assembly resolution, containing the Charter Amendment as an annex, which is constitutionally the right way to go. After a ratification process and the entry into force of the amendments, there would be elections for the newly composed Security Council, in particular in the new category of seats. The history of the intermediate model shows that it was meant, first of all, to bridge the gap between two dominant positions at the time – the G4 and the Uniting for Consensus position – while at the same time being a viable option of its own. Under the old G4 model, there would be a different approach. The Assembly would pass a framework resolution, then proceed to a selection of new permanent members and then proceed to a Charter amendment. Constitutionally speaking, this is not a desirable sequence.

Our Model is perfectly understandable and clear, but we do not claim that it commands a majority. This, in fact, applies to all the proposals currently on the table: if any of the proposed models were to find the politically viable support of the membership, we would not be sitting here, but in the Assembly hall, voting on these amendments. I have serious doubts that there is a politically viable majority for any suggested model. And this is in fact the situation we have found ourselves in since the 2005 World Summit – and indeed since long before that.

As you know, our national position is that a bigger Security Council is not necessarily a better one. It is true that its current composition does not reflect the geopolitical reality of today, but something else must be done to make the Council more effective, legitimate and transparent. This sentiment was also expressed by the World Summit. We acknowledge that the Council has undertaken important efforts in this respect. At the same time, much is necessary in this regard, and we need to see both a consistent application and implementation of the measures taken by the Security Council itself and measures that go beyond what the Council has decided. Currently, such implementation largely depends on who holds the presidency. Brazil, for example, has conducted its presidency in an exemplary manner, and we would like to thank them for this and express our hope that future presidencies will match these standards. The S-5 Group is currently working on new suggestions on working methods that will be shared with the membership soon.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to commend you on producing your two new papers. We do agree that they do not constitute a negotiating text, but they do provide a useful structure. When States are able to fill in the blanks, we will be able to move this process forward. You can be assured of our continued support in this matter.

I thank you